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In the last four years, since Volume I of this Bibliography first appeared, there has been an explosion of literature in all the main functional areas of business. This wealth of material poses problems for the researcher in management studies — and, of course, for the librarian: uncovering what has been written in any one area is not an easy task. This volume aims to help the librarian and the researcher overcome some of the immediate problems of identification of material. It is an annotated bibliography of management, drawing on the wide variety of literature produced by MCB University Press. Over the last four years, MCB University Press has produced an extensive range of books and serial publications covering most of the established and many of the developing areas of management. This volume, in conjunction with Volume I, provides a guide to all the material published so far.

The emergence in the post‐war period of industrial relations as a rapidly growing field of study was a consequence of the subject becoming increasingly defined as a “problem”. During the 1950s and 60s the increasing level of strike activity, especially unofficial and unconstitutional strikes, attracted widespread attention. Low labour productivity and wage inflation were also widely seen as important industrial relations problems. These problems attracted the attention of academics from a wide variety of disciplines who developed the study of industrial relations in a way which largely reflected this preoccupation with problems.

In reviewing the personnel management literature, this article argues that promotion has been a very neglected area, especially in Britain. Personnel management writers have tended to assume that most appointments are made by recruitment from the external labour market, even though many employers have shown a preference for the promotion of existing employees.

An article in the last issue of this journal examined the literature on seniority promotion systems, arguing that most personnel management writers had ignored promotion as a topic area, tending to assume implicitly that most appointments are made from the external labour market. And yet many employers preferred internal promotion to external recruitment. It was also possible to identify a number of pressures on management to adopt both an internal labour market and a seniority‐based promotion system. These pressures were thought to be particularly pertinent in the case of white‐collar employees.

The paper seeks to investigate the effects of the 2004 Central and East European EU Enlargement on labour mobility.

The paper is based on an analysis of recently available empirical evidence from the UK Labour Registration Scheme and EU comparative data based on administrative data and labour force surveys.

Only Ireland, Austria and Germany had significant migration from CEE migration and none of these exceeded 2 per cent of the labour force. The imposition of a transitional arrangement had little effect on migration flows. CEE workers were predominantly young, had above average education and yet did not fill UK skills gaps, but filled labour shortages for low paid, unskilled work.

This paper assesses the empirical evidence on labour mobility from Central and Eastern Europe, which is used to assess the current highly contentious debate.

Month after month we bring forward additional evidence of the injury resulting from the use of chemical “preservatives” in food, while the Authorities feebly hesitate to give specific legal effect to the recommendations of the Departmental Committee which made such a complete inquiry into this question. The evidence upon which those recommendations were based has been fully corroborated by a number of different observers. FERE and others have shown that, as regards boric acid and borax, even when administered in the smallest medicinal doses, there is always the risk that these drugs may aggravate, or even produce, renal diseases. These observations have been confirmed by the work of Dr. CHARLES HARRINGTON, an account of which has been recently published. Twelve cats were fed on the same food; six were treated with borax, one had no preservative, and five were given a preservative which had no apparent effect. The experiment extended over a period of 133 days, the quantity of borax given averaging about 0.5 grms, per diem. Three of the borated cats soon became ill, and one died at the end of six weeks. On the termination of the experiment the cats were all killed, and upon examination it was found that the organs of the six cats which had not taken borax were in perfectly sound and healthy condition, while the others, with one exception, were all suffering from nephritis. Of course, instances are recorded in which patients have been treated with borax and boracic acid with apparently no injurious result, but as a general rule these experiments have been of too short duration to allow of the desired information being arrived at, and the results must therefore be regarded as inconclusive and unreliable. It is perfectly evident that the kidneys may be for a short time quite capable of eliminating many objectionable substances, but the long‐continued use of such bodies, as Dr. HARRINGTON'S researches clearly indicate, sets up an inflammatory condition of the kidneys which, of course, interferes with the effective performance of their proper functions, and lays the foundations for complications of the most serious nature.

This article models debt market equilibrium given an expanded notion of rational behavior. The model extends Diamond's model of reputation acquisition, by assuming that some prospective borrower‐investors are opportunistic utility maximizers, while others are unwilling to mislead borrowers as to their intended use of borrowed funds. We find that the presence of honest borrowers is necessary to the function of debt markets, and that, as in real‐world markets, opportunistic and honest agents can coexist. We further find that total economic activity is positively correlated to the proportion of trustworthy agents. A major research concern in financial economics is the reconciliation of observed behavior with the predictions of the perfect‐markets, utility‐maximization models, which have traditionally supplied the dominant paradigm in finance. The main focus of recent research has been on the predictions of Agency Theory, or simply Agency (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency has its origins in the property rights literature of economic theory (Alchian, 1969) and, in essence, addresses the following question: How do rational agents act in imperfect markets? A whole range of market imperfections have been analyzed ranging from the simplest type of moral hazard and adverse selection (Thakor, 1989) to the debt capacity of an industry (Maksimovic and Zechner, 1991). Indeed, few if any areas of business theory have escaped Agency's scrutiny; it has, in effect, recast the theory of the firm. In this light, the firm becomes a structure whose efficiency depends upon its ability to mitigate the costs associated with Agency. Firms are “legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relations among individuals” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.310). One of the major gaps in the one‐period models of agency behavior has been the inability of these models to explain management's “honest” behavior (Thaler, 1992). That is, managers do not always engage in such “rational” acts as risk‐shifting, or paying excessive dividends, in order to enrich shareholders (and themselves) at the expense of bondholders. A significant move toward reconciling Agency's predictions with observed behavior has resulted from the reputation‐acquisition work of Diamond (1989), building on the work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). In these models, agents acquire reputations by demonstrating some consistent mode of behavior through multiple iterations of a contractual situation. Through these iterations, principals modify their beliefs concerning the future behavior of the agent by observing certain outcomes. In Diamond's model, rational agents will not continually choose either a risky project or safe project. Their choice is a function of the interest rate and the stage of the game. Specifically, these agents choose the risky project initially; then, as attrition among risk‐takers causes interest rates to drop, they shift to the safe project for some iterations. As the end of the game approaches, however, these agents once again revert to investing in the risky project. In comparison with the attention that has been devoted to identifying and analyzing market imperfections, the former part of the Agency question — namely the “rational agents” part — has attracted much less attention in the finance literature. In Agency models, rationality has been defined strictly in terms of the individual pursuit of pecuniary wealth. This expected‐utility model has been tested experimentally and has been found to be systematically violated, in at least two fundamental ways: 1) Individuals do not behave as if they are attempting to maximize wealth (Plott, 1986), and 2) Individual behavior is affected by notions of fairness and cooperation (Kahneman, et al, 1986). Attempts to construct a theory of capital market behavior which can accommodate this observed behavior are virtually nonexistent. This lack is probably due to the presumption that opportunistic agents will drive ethical agents out of the market. However, as we demonstrate in the model developed in this paper, this is not necessarily the case. By focusing attention specifically on Agency's rationality premise, the model developed here differs from antecedent Agency models. This article investigates the implication, for financial‐market equilibra, of an alternative rationality premise. We assume that some agents will display the virtues of honesty and trustworthiness in their dealings with Other agents. Modifying Diamond's (1989) model of reputation acquisition in debt markets, the impact of these ‘virtuous’ agents on financial‐market equilibria is investigated. The model indicates that the existence of trustworthy agents in financial markets is not merely desirable from an economic perspective, but actually is essential if debt markets are not to fail. Specifically, if lenders do not belief that some non‐trivial cohort of trustworthy agents exists, then lenders cease to lend and debt markets cease to function. Also, the greater the proportion of honest agents, the greater is the overall level of economic activity; indeed, the existence of honest agents will tend to induce at least some of the opportunistic agents to act virtuously. We find that, as Bowie observes in a more general context, “[i]t only pays to lie or cheat when you can free ride off the honesty of others” (1991, pp.11–12). In addition, the belief in a non‐trivial cohort of trustworthy agents can lead to the elimination of some agency problems.

Coaches from both the professional and college ranks are often put forth as archetypal examples of effective leaders – individuals’ whose behaviors, styles, and wisdom provide the ever elusive playbook for how to successfully lead others. While numerous books and articles in the popular press put forth advice from leaders in the sports world, numerous empirical studies of the drivers of successful sports leadership and the factors that contribute to leader success in the context of sports have also been conducted. In this chapter, we first provide a broad review of empirical leadership research conducted within the sports world and examine how research within the sports context provides a suitable and advantageous setting for leadership research in general. Second, we offer a road map of opportunities for future leadership studies within the context of sports. The goal of this chapter is to stimulate and rally more thought-provoking research related to leadership in sports that generates insights for organizational leadership across contexts.

The management of children′s literature is a search for value and suitability. Effective policies in library and educational work are based firmly on knowledge of materials, and on the bibliographical and critical frame within which the materials appear and might best be selected. Boundaries, like those between quality and popular books, and between children′s and adult materials, present important challenges for selection, and implicit in this process are professional acumen and judgement. Yet also there are attitudes and systems of values, which can powerfully influence selection on grounds of morality and good taste. To guard against undue subjectivity, the knowledge frame should acknowledge the relevance of social and experiential context for all reading materials, how readers think as well as how they read, and what explicit and implicit agendas the authors have. The good professional takes all these factors on board.

WHILE there is no doubt that the system of issuing books at “net” prices is of great benefit to booksellers, there is also no doubt that, unless care is taken, it is a serious drain upon a limited book‐purchasing income. A few years ago the position had become so serious that conferences were held with a view to securing the exemption of Public Libraries from the “net” price. The attempt, as was perhaps to be expected, failed. Since that time, the system has been growing until, at the present time, practically every non‐fictional book worth buying is issued at a “net price.”